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dominate any discussion or assessment
of ASW operations. For the reader
seeking that type of detail, the book’s
extensive footnotes and bibliography
are valuable sources for research on
several types of technical information, tactics, and historical events.
Anti-submarine Warfare from 1943
stimulates the reader to think critically
about the trends and inflection points
in the lethal relationship between the
submarine and ASW operations.
SEAN SULLIVAN

Honor before Glory: The Epic World War II Story
of the Japanese-American GIs Who Rescued the
Lost Battalion, by Scott McGaugh. Boston: Da
Capo, 2016. 304 pages. $25.99.

What is as stirring as a tale of a “lost
battalion”? The story elements are
simple. A hard-fighting group of
American soldiers gets out in front
of advancing troops and eventually is
surrounded by the enemy. A prolonged
fight ensues as the battalion fights
for its life, while other U.S. and allied
forces mount repeated attempts to find
and then rescue the lost battalion.
Perhaps the most famous of all U.S. lost
battalions was a force of slightly more
than 550 men, primarily from the 308th
Battalion of the 77th Division, during
the Meuse-Argonne offensive of October
1918. Low on food, water, and other supplies, the battalion withstood repeated
German attacks for six days. When
finally “rescued,” the battalion had
only 194 men. On relief of the 308th,
the battalion’s commander, a bespectacled major from Wisconsin named
Charles Whittlesey, was promoted
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immediately and soon after received
the Congressional Medal of Honor.
In World War II, the title of “the lost
battalion” was worn by the 1st Battalion,
141st Infantry Regiment of the Army’s
36th Infantry Division. The 141st was
a Texas National Guard outfit and, like
the 308th twenty-six years earlier, it had
its brush with fame during a wet and
cold October in France. On October 23,
1944, the 141st was ordered to advance
into the Vosges Mountains. Members
of the 141st were assured that a “strong
force” would follow them. The terrain
was steep and heavily forested, with but
a single logging road. The Germans,
with their usual tenacity and competent
generalship, conducted a tenacious
defense over ground they knew well.
The battalion made good progress on
the 23rd, advancing four miles along
the logging road, and the advance
continued the next day; the battalion
reached its objective after covering
six more miles. Shortly afterward the
Germans conducted a heavy artillery
bombardment. An effort was made to
reinforce the battalion with light tanks
and artillery, but it failed owing to the
dense forest. By dusk, the 1st Battalion
was surrounded—cut off from resupply,
medical aid, and reinforcements. If not
relieved, destruction by or surrender
to the Germans appeared inevitable.
Major General John Dahlquist, commanding the 36th Division, set about
organizing a relief. He chose the 442nd
Regimental Combat Team to serve as
his primary assault force. Although
the 442nd troops had just been taken
off the line for some well-deserved
rest and resupply, their reputation as
highly competent assault troops was
a major factor in Dahlquist’s decision.
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Colonel Charles Pence, commanding
the 442nd, was not surprised by the
selection. Word of the 1st Battalion’s
difficulty had spread quickly, and Pence
already had ordered planning to begin.
The men of the 442nd, although
annoyed at having to leave their rest
areas almost as soon as they arrived,
got the job done. During five days of
intense fighting the unit advanced,
through terrible terrain and against good
defenses. The 141st’s situation remained
precarious, with only intermittently
successful airdrops and propagandaleaflet shells used to resupply the troops.
Senior leaders grew increasingly
frustrated and personality clashes more
frequent, especially when General
Dahlquist, fearing he would be relieved
for failure in command, became more
and more micromanagerial in directing
the rescue effort. On October 30, lead
elements of the 442nd made contact
with the surviving members of the 141st.
According to one scholar, the 442nd lost
fifty-four men killed in action and 156
wounded in reaching the lost battalion;
211 soldiers of the 1/141 were rescued.
If this were all there was to the story, it
still would be worth the telling; however,
there is more. The 442nd was a nisei
outfit. Its ranks were filled with Japanese
Americans from Hawaii and elsewhere
in the United States. Many of the latter
had left internment camps to fight
for the country that had forced their
families from their homes and placed
them under armed guard and behind
barbed wire. Yet the 442nd was the
most decorated unit of its size in the
U.S. Army. (Sadly, McGaugh reminds
the reader, superior service would not
be enough to protect at least some
members of the 442nd from unyielding
race prejudice even after the war.)
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McGaugh—a former newsman, the
author of more than half a dozen books,
and the current marketing director of
the Midway Museum—knows a good
war story when he sees one. Honor before
Glory is a battle study, a tale of shared
hardship and forged bonds similar to
Stephen Ambrose’s Band of Brothers. The
work also may be read as a broader story
of nisei soldiers, who were subjected to
pernicious racism, institutional bias, and
belated attempts to right past wrongs.
With so many potential avenues to
explore, it should not be a surprise that
Honor before Glory sprawls. Although
all the aforementioned elements are
touched on, none are developed as
fully as they might be. To some degree,
there was nothing McGaugh could do
about this. The problem with writing
the next Band of Brothers is that there
are not that many “brothers” left.
Ambrose’s book was published in 1992,
McGaugh’s in 2016; in the intervening
twenty-four years, the survivors of the
Second World War have continued to
dwindle in numbers, and neither the
442nd nor the 141st has been spared
in this regard. For a group memoir to
be successful, there needs to be some
undefined, yet real, critical mass of
memories. The remaining voices of the
442nd continue to tell an exceptional
story, but there were only fifty or so
oral interviews from the men of the
442nd, and considerably fewer from
their counterparts in the 141st. To his
credit, McGaugh tried to find German
voices to add to the story, but time has
taken a toll on former enemies as well.
Honor before Glory also could use some
improvement as a battle study, beginning with more and higher-quality maps
and illustrations. For all its difficulty,
the relief of the 1/141 was a small battle.
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Although McGaugh provides a glossary
of names and an order of battle, more is
needed, including a detailed time line.
McGaugh also would have been well
served by including more information
on German movements and actions. Of
course, it may have been that the men
of the 716th Volksgrenadier Division
and other German units did not feel
the same sense of urgency to capture
the battalion as U.S. commanders felt
to save it, and simply did less than U.S.
forces. More information regarding the
quality of German troops and the types
of equipment each side carried would
be welcome. However, again to be fair
to McGaugh, given the passage of time,
the loss of records, and the inherent
difficulty of identifying exact locations
on a seventy-year-old battleground,
answering these challenges is not easy.
The story of the nisei is too big for
this book, even when the focus is
narrowed to only the nisei in the 442nd,
but McGaugh makes the most of the
opportunity. He reminds the reader that
the nisei went through basic training in
Louisiana and other southern locales
where race prejudice was palpable. In
discussions of the 442nd’s exemplary
combat record, a frequently encountered
explanation is that the men of the 442nd
felt they had something to prove—they
wanted to lay down irrefutable
evidence that they were as good as or
better than any other U.S. soldiers.
McGaugh offers two alternate or
supplementary explanations to this more
common one. The first—and more
disturbing—is that the 442nd gained
more combat decorations and awards for
heroism because it deliberately was used
in dangerous situations and missions—
and this was because the men, being
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nisei, were seen as expendable. Some of
the survivors of the 442nd voice this theory with conviction, but similar claims
are likely to issue from any unit that
had fought hard, then was pulled out of
a rest area to fight some more. Having
allowed this notion to see the light of
day, McGaugh just leaves it, without
refutation, confirmation, or even a
personal opinion, requiring readers to
make up their own minds. The other
possible explanation is more intriguing.
McGaugh suggests that the nisei may
have fought so well because they were
nisei. Concepts of honor and duty were
part of their identity. Many owned and
some wore the senninbari, the “belt of
1,000 stitches” that female relatives made
to protect their loved ones from harm.
Perhaps the men of the 442nd fought so
well because they had been brought up
amid a blend of powerful social/civic
expectations and community values
that owed as much to Japan as to the
United States. Unfortunately, having
brought up this possible explanation
for the demonstrated valor of the
nisei, McGaugh again simply leaves
the reader to individual speculation.
In the final portion of the book,
McGaugh illuminates yet another way
in which the nisei were undervalued
by the nation they served. Dozens of
nisei soldiers were nominated for the
Medal of Honor during the war; only
two of the awards were approved. In
1997, the Army reviewed the original
nominations, and the review board
subsequently recommended that
twenty-two of the nisei soldiers be
awarded the Medal of Honor, as their
immediate commanders had intended.
McGaugh provides descriptions of the
combat actions of three of these men,
and those accounts leave little doubt
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that in these three cases, at the very
least, the upgraded award was justified.
Being identified as “the lost battalion”
rankled survivors of the 141st, who
claimed they were neither lost nor
rescued. The first claim is true: the
battalion’s location was known from
beginning to end. The second claim is
harder to adjudicate. As the five days
wore on, food, ammunition, medical
supplies, and other necessities dwindled
to dangerous levels, and the battalion
was judged unable to effect its own
extraction. McGaugh makes a compelling case that this was indeed a rescue.
At the end of the day, despite minor
flaws, Honor before Glory is a book
worth reading. The story of the nation’s
nisei families and their soldier sons’
battle experiences remains well worth
telling as an example of extraordinary
patriotism and courage in the face
of reprehensible actions taken out
of pain, prejudice, and fear.
RICHARD J. NORTON

Routledge Handbook of Ethics and War: Just War
Theory in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Fritz Allhoff, Nicholas G. Evans, and Adam Henschke.
New York: Routledge, 2015. 418 pages. $245.

In an anthology of provocative and
insightful essays both comprehensive
and diverse in nature, the editors of
this work on just war theory make a
significant contribution to the genre
of applied ethics. Allhoff, Evans, and
Henschke enlist professors, retired
military officers, journalists, theologians,
and computer scientists as essayists to
examine the efficacy and applicability of
the just war tradition vis-à-vis the latest
developments in technology, culture,
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and politics. Although the writing style
is accessible to the novice who wants
to understand better the essentials
of just war theory, this collection of
essays provides the scholar-warrior and
professor with substantive research and
the latest modifications to a theory that
has been tried and trusted for millennia.
The editors incorporate a wide range
of theorists, including both those who
reject the just war tradition as obsolete,
given the evolution of warfare, and
those who support just war criteria as
reliable principles for the conduct of
warfare in the twenty-first century.
In this exciting forum of ideas, opponents and proponents of just war theory
introduce concepts worthy of serious
consideration. While the book resembles
a recent installment of the Star Wars
movies in its probing of the morals of
unmanned drones, lethal autonomous
robots, cyberspace nonkinetics, and
more, the writers call on the great philosophers of the past to help address the
latest trends and projections of national
security measures. Under the category
“Theories of War,” contributors critique
and defend the criteria to justify the
commencement of war (jus ad bellum),
the criteria by which war is conducted
(jus in bello), and the criteria by which
war is concluded with postconflict
stabilization, reconstruction, and humanitarian assistance (jus post bellum).
The editors do not stack the deck to bias
the reader toward or against just war
theory, and this illustrates the distinct
virtue of this scholarly undertaking: its
diversity of themes and perspectives.
Whether it is Jeff McMahan’s argument
that the soldier has an epistemic responsibility to ascertain whether the war in
which he or she fights is just, or Richard
Werner’s psychological thesis that most
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